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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
~IARK

KASFELL,
Plaintiff,

vs.

OGDEX CITY, UTAH,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant.

STATE:}IENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set out in the plaintiff's brief
is a correct statement of the facts as stipulated and
which are therefore controlling in this appeaL

STATE1vfENT OF

POIN~rs

~rhe city will answer and argue the five points posed
by the appellant in the order set forth and argued in
appellant's brief. In addition, the city contends that
its ordinance No. 343 is merely declarative of what was
already the la,Y, in that, even without ordinance No. 343,
proof of a vehicle standing or parking in violation of
an ordinance of Ogden City, together with proof that
the defendant is the owner of that vehicle is prima facie
evidence that the defendant owner committed or authorized the commission of such violation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT I.
APPELLANT 1 S CONTENTION THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF OGDEN CITY TO PASS
SUCH ORDINANCE NO. 343.
The City's answer to this contention of the appellant iR three-fold. First, it is subn1itted that the City
has not only those powers ''given it directly by the
constitution or statute, or such powers as may he reasonably implied as being necessary in the enforcement of
such powers,'' but also those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted.
Second, it is submitted that power to enact the ordinance is necessarily implied under power delegated to
it by statute. Third, it is submitted that Ordinance
No. 343 is within the s12ecific grant of general police
po,,·er as being. one necessary an<! 2r9p~rjg pr.ov!9!t,
for the;~fety an<f~i~~h~. p_e~~~ and gooq,..,2rl!gr,
comfort arid conveii"ience of the Cjty and its inh~bit~nt.s.
---~·------

·----···

First then, regarding the breadth of the powers of
municipal corporations, we believe that one citation will
be all that is necessary to open this avenue for the
court. In Volume One, McQuillan on the Laws of Municipal Corporatiot~, Second Edition, Section 367, Note
41, it is said:
''Every investigation, therefore, of its (the
municipality's) powers must be conducted from
the standpoint of such laws. Wherefore, the
usual formula, invariably supported by judicial
utterances and judgments, in substance is: That
the only powers a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise are : ( 1) Those granted
in express terms; (2) those necessarily or fairly
2
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implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly
granted; and (3) tho"P t>ssential to the declared
objects and purposes of the muncipality, not
merely convenient, hnt indispensable. This rule
is supported by a wealth of decisions in pracieally every state n~ illustrated by the more reC'ent ca~es set forth below.''
If the opinion of this eminent authority and the
cited h~- him establish the law to be as stated,
and we believe they do, then it is submitted that Ordina~~~. Xo_. ~43 is an exercise <?f a power ''fairly .implied
ii1 O,E. incident _to tJ.Ie powrrs _Er~:l?ressly gTanted~" As
will appear from our argument on the second division
of this point. the circumstances are such that the powerto regulate traffic and parking on the public streets is
absolutely aborted unless it carries with it the. p_ow~;_
to establish such rp.les of evidence as make it practicaif~~-possible to enfor-ce th~ parldng ~egulations. Ce;.
tilii~fy- the means of enforcement of~--a~-- regulatio~ is
"fairly" implied in the power to make the regulation.

ra:-;t'~

The city contents that the power to enact that
ordinance is necessarily implied under the power delegated to it by statute. Section 57-7-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides in part as follows:
'' (a) The provisions of this act are intended
to confer upon local authorities the right of, and
shall not be deemed to deprive said authorities
of existing powers with respect to streets and
highways under their jursdiction and within the
reasonable exercise of the police power in:
"(1) Regulating the standing or parking of
vehicleSiilclucling· the requirement for payment
ota parking fee which fee may vary in order to
i:elieve traffic congestion in de signa ted areas.'' ~

3----
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That section was enacted in 1941, and it expressly
reserves to local authorities their ''existing powers''
to regulate the standing or parking of vehicles on streets
and highways. What were the "existing powers" in
those matters~ Prior to the enactment in 1941 of the
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, of which
Act Section 57-7-85 above quoted is one section, the
local authoritieH had much broader powers over traffic,
use of the streets, and the like. Some of those powers
are defined in the following code sections:
Section 15-8-11, l;tah Code Annotated, 1943:
''They (boards of commissioners and city
councils of cities) may regulate the use of streets,
alleys avenues, sidewalks, crosswalks, parks and
public grounds, prevent and remove obstruCtions and encroachments thereon, ..... "
Section 15-8-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1943:
"'1_1hey may regulate the movement of traffic
on the streets, sidewalks and public places, ... ''
( Section 15-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1943:
''They may pass all ordinances and rules,
and make all regulations, not ~ugant.)o law~..
necessary for carrying _i:qJ:Q:_ eif.ec.Lor discharging all powers and duties conferred by .~his ch§4Qter' an"CTSiiCna'Sirenecessary and proper to
provide for the safety and preserve the health,
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace and good order, comfort and convenience
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein; and may
enforce obedience. to such ordinances with such
~es
pe!lifti~·; ·~~. ~~~i-~~y-<lee~
pro:..

or

_pro_pe:;

4
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rided, that the punishn1ent of any offense shall
be by fine in any snm less than $300 or by imprisonment not to exceed si~ months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.''

The city contends that the enactment of the Uniform Traffic Act, by Section 57-7-85, reserved to Ogden
Cit_Lallrights as to parking of vehicles on its streets _ d:. ~
that had theretofore been delegated to the city by the ~ I..JJ,
sections of the code ~hove quott>d. It follows that the)~ r.,~ Je
city's power to enact ~~-t~- ?n~innuc~ No. -~-1.?i§ derive~ l
~
not only from Section 57::-J-85, rtah_ C..Q<!~---AEn()!ated,f'
1943, but a~he--p~~,.e-~:s
delegated by Sections--i5-8-li,!
.
.
-i
30 and 84, l-:-tah Code Annotated, 1943.
-'

J-·

-~

These sections give the pow·er to Ogden City to
regulate parking on its streets~ and, if it desires, to
exact a parking fee for said parking. They give the
eity powers as broad and as all inclusive as can be stated
in all matters relating to parking and standing vehicles
on its streets. Indeed, it appears the local authorities
are given the exclusive right to control and regulate- ...4parking within their own boundaries. ~ ~ ~ ~
It is common knowledge that because of the num- ~~
her of motor vehicles involved, the miles of parking
space, the limited number of police officers, and the
other limitations of time and facilities, l!..J-__~_ p~actically a.l;e
impossible for th~ police offic~rs to observe and arrest~
t~~ p_ersou wh~ actually parks a vehicle in violation of ~·~~/
the par~~~g~~a'!s. For e.:xample, !~ere -~r~}!~7 parking -2~~.~
meters in~ Ogde11_ ~~ity.,., They are along both sides of ~
Slreets totaling ~imately two miles in length. It
would requir~ officer full time during the hours the

~~~
~;~·

5
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-;t;b

meters are required to be operated for each half block
of meters to actually observe the persons parking the
same.

h
rJA~i

Consider the other parking laws---parking in alleys,
by fire hydrants, in theater zones, and the like. From
the very nature of the violation, it is very rare that a
police officer o1· an interested citizen actually observes
the drivers park in violation of such laws. The practical situtation is that an- officer or someone affected
thereby observes a vehicle unlawfully parked. The
driver might not return to the vehicle for hours; and
undoubtedly o ftime~ the person who drives the vehicle
away is not the person who parked it.

There are just not enough police officers in Ogden
City and undoubtedly not in .any other city to wait by
each improperly parked vehicle until the driver returns.
rJI"' (, 4' And even if there were, if appellant's arguments are
~
followed to t~ei~ logical concl.usions, i~ is impossible in
/the great maJonty of cases for the City to prove that
the person who gets into an improperly parked car
and drives it away is the person who improperly parked
the same.

·,1'·/

It follows from the practical situtation and physical facts that parking laws cannot reasonably be enforced by the city unless the registered owner of the
vehicle which is parked in violation of any of the parking laws is prima facie responsible for the violation
of that law.
The legislatu:re has delegated plenary powers to
the cities to control and regulate parking. Does that
means the cities have the power only to enact ordinance
6
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defining- what is and what i~ not lPg-nl parking, or doeH
it mean that the city, con~idPring all the ph.n-1ieal conditions and eircumstaneP~ can al:-;o gi,·e those parking
ordinances life and enforcPnbility by providing that the
owner of vehiclPs i:-; prima faeiP responsible for
the parking violations? It i~ not to he presumed that
the legislature did a ns<'h'ss thing when it gave cities (},j--· ~
power to control and regulate parking·. It follows that ; ~ -1 .l,#
the cities han the implied power to enaet such ordinaces ?~
as make the parking ordinances enforceable. Ogden
City's ordinan~_t' X o. 343 is such !:ln ordinance.

l ·

The same argument as herein made by the appellant has been made in other like cases, to which the
same answer has been given by the city there involved.
In the case of People v. Bigman, 38 Calif. App.
2d Supp. 773, 100 P. (~) 370, the Supreme Court of
California had before it an interpretation of the validity
of utatute whose provisions were substantially identical to the provisions of the ordinances here before the
court, and the court, in finding that the statute was
constitutional and within the legislative powers of the
state, said as follows :
~'The great convenience _to the state through
operat:loi1()!1his presumption ill the proof. of
identity of operators in cases of illegal parking
on the thousands of miles of highways in the
state or to the officers of a municipality in enforcing the laws within the more limited but still
relatively extensive public streets therein, is
readily apparent. It is a matter of common
knowledge, of which we may take notice, that
it would be, and has in fact been, impractical for

7
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a city the size of that wherein this prosecution
arose (Los Angeles; and we do not doubt that
the same is relatively true in municipalities
throughout the state) to maintain a police force
large enough to personally detect any substantial portion of vehicular parking law violators
by observing them in the act of illegal parking
or by discovering the illegally parked vehicle
and awaiting the return of the absent operator;.;.
The extent of the convenience to the state it
'
seems apparent to us, will far outweigh such
inconvenience as may be occasioned to some
registered owners whose automobiles when used
by others may be illegally parked and result in
the owners having to appear and answer the
charges. In such instances, however, except in
the comparatively rare cases of stolen or unlawfully mcved cars, the owners can protect themselves by permiting their automobiles to be used
only by persons who will be responsible to them
for any unlawful parking of the vehicles. In any
event, the in-convenience is basically caused not
by the operation of the presumption of identity
of the operator but rather by the violation by
the actual operator of the substantive law involved. In no way whatsoever does the operation of the presumption preclude the owner from
his right to challenge the fact as to who did
operate the vehicle.''
In the case of City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill . .App.
623, 49 N. E. (2) 802, (1943), the problem there before
the court was much the same as here, and on the question
of the difficulties of arresting the person who actually
parked the vehicle, the court said :
"It is common knowledge that many thousands of
automobiles are parked in the streets at all times,
8
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and it would be inconYenient and impossible for
a municipality such a~ Chicago to keep watch
over the parked vehicles to nsecrtain who in fact
operated or parked them.''
In a .Mas.saehusetts case, Commuuwealth v. Ober,
:2811 Jlass. 25, 189 S.E. 60±, the eourt said:
'• In the instant case, the public mischief to be
averted is obvious. The inconvenience of keeping watch over parked vehicles to ascertain who
in fact operates them would be impracticable,
if not impossible, at a time when many vehicles
are parked. \Ve think the rules and regulations
of the Boston Traffic Commission . . . were
framed and intended to cover and make punishable any ·dolations of Section 31 (5), 1917 (4)
by the o"\vner of the registered vehicle, whether
the particular violation or violations were by
the owner or were by a person allowed, permitted
or suffered by the owner of any vehicle registered
in his name, in any street, way, highway, road
or parkway under the control of the City of
Boston.''
Where the same question was before the :Missouri
court in City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221 S.W. (2) 468,
the court said :
''From a practical standpoint it would be impossible for the poliee department of the City
of St. Louis to keep a watch over all parked
vehicles to ascertain who in fact operates them.
In such a situation and in view of the purpose
of City's traffic regulations, the City having
shown the vehicle to have been parked in violation
of the regulatory ordinance and having shown a
defendant to he the person in whose name the

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vehicle is registered, it would seem an ownerregistrant, a defendant, could not be said to be
put to great an inconvenience or to an unreasonable hardship in making an explanation if he
desires. The connection between the registered
owner of an automobile and its operation is a
natural one. While there are no doubt instances
where an owner's automobile is used without his
authorization, yet it is not generally so. If, in
fact, defendant's vehicle was parked at the time
without any authorization from defendant, such
fact was peculiarly within defendant's knowledge
and, if defendant had desired, the fact could
have been easily proved with such certainty as
to almost entirely preclude a false conviction.
In our opinion the inference authorized by the
Ordinance No. 41240 is a reasonable one. The
ordinance does not make any inferred fact conclusive. And the ordinance does not require that
a defendant testify; nor does it deny him his
right to make out his defense, or to testify.''
Of course, there are not the number of vehicles in
Ogden City that there are in Chicago, Boston, Los
Angeles, and St. Louis, which are the cities the cited cases
concern. However, there also are not the number of
police officers in Ogden City that there are in those
large cities, and the arguments mentioned in those
cases apply with equal force to a city the size of Ogden.

•1

In Commonwealth v. Kroger, 122 S.W. (2) 1006, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky had before it an ordinan~
of the citx.._ of Newport, Kentuck.z. The defendant made
the contention that the authority to make such a prima
facie statute was not given the city by the legislature
of the state, the defendant maintaining that while it
was competent for a state legislature to provide for

10
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the creation of prima facie presumptions, that right was
not possessed by municip::l legislatiYe boards. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky found that by necessary
implication, thl' grant. of authority by the legislatu~e
to the rity to legislate under the eneral police power
\Yas sufficient to reg·ulate traffic, and having regu~
traffic, it was like·wise proper for them to :g_rov~e fQ.L
sucE._a; rule <?f e~·icle1!~~ ~.S_.necessary for effective enforcement.
~

Counsel contends that the courts of this state are
created by the Constitution and by statutes passed by
the State Legislature, and that cities are not given
power of any sort over such courts. It is submitted that
within the scope of authority which has been delegated
to cities, they may enact ordinances which the courts
of this state must recognize. We fail to see what appellant means by his contention that the cities have no
power over tge~ c<_>~s. Certainly, within the realm of
delegated powers, the courts are bound by the ordinances
the cities enact. So, the problem reverts back to the
initial contention and the initial problem, and that is
whether or not in this case Ogden City has the express
or implied power to enact its ordinance No. 343. If the
city does have that power, then the ordinance is bind~ng on the courts. If It does not have that power,· tl}~
ordinance is invalid and therefore not binding on the
courts. We submit that the ordinance is valid and bindIng.
As to the third division of our argument on this
point, it is observed that by the provisions of Section
15-8-84 cities are granted not only power to pass ordinances necessary for carrying into effect powers and

11
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duties specifically conferred, but also ''such as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety, ... 1mpro~
the morals, peace and good order, comfort and conveni"ence ot tfie e1Hes an<l tile Inhabitants thereof a~d f~r
the
rotection of property therein." (Italics added).
~------~~----~--------~~~~~---~A~
We believe t a
1s cou Wl
ake judicial notice of
the dangers, the breaches of the peace and the chaos,
the discomfort and inconvenience which would inevitably
result in any American city of any size, in this motorized age, if there were no effective regulations of the
parking of private vehicles upon the city streets. The
streets would be monopolized and traffic obstructed by
the selfish and unsocial among vehicle operators. Their
activities would inevitably provoke the resentment arrd
retaliation of other citizens. For all practical purposes
the business district of a modern city can not exist as
a comfort and convenience to the citizens unless the
parking of vehicles can be effectively regulated by the
local public authont,y. Property values would inevitably
fall and the city as an effective and funnctioning social
unit would be paralized if such regultions were not
effective.
Perhaps this picture is to some extent exaggerated,
but if so, the exaggeration is slight.
r:rhis court has held in the case of Gronlund vs.
Salt Lake City
Utah
, 194 Pac. 2nd 464, that
this general g-rant of police power to cities is sufficient
to support a Sunday closing law so long as it also violates no c_£nstitutional pr_wision. Certahify if the· closin.s..
of businesses on Sunsl~.I...J§.~ll.... tJI.~ p;9wers of ~
cUJ:, the power to make effective -parking regulations
~or Y§h]£1~w§ic!i ~s e~en ill.?l~~ssary o ~P..~~

12
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~~_ti~~-i~ also within the- ~ An~l--~~--}~_~1~-~~~n
J?O_illt~l out 1H'rt>ttl~o_n~._ tl:'_' en!o_~~~~~§I1~___qL_~ P!!.!-~~~1~·
regnlat~111_i~ a~ a pr!:etivat' -inn:~impossih1e unless the
Onliumwe No. 343 is aYailahle to the /A.
rule e~tahli~lwd hY·- ---------------local authorities. It seems clear that the power to pass
Urdn1ance Xo. 3-!3 ~s specifit·ally included in the grant .--"
of powers to provide foi>the general welfare Jts above
----~
quoted.
:----:--~--:--:-:---

-

~-

.

I

\Ye submit that the appellant's point number one
is not well taken.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT SUCH
ORDIXAXCE NO. 343 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, IN THAT IT DENIES HIM CERTAIN
PRIVILEGES GRANTEiD HIM UNDER SUCH
CONSTITUTIONS.
It is difficult for the city to understand how the
appellant can urge that ordinance No. 343 is uncontitutional when, on Page 9 of his brief and again on Page
14, he indicates that had the State Legislature enacted
the same ordinance, it would have been within its authority. However, we are answering the contentions
made by the appellant, ( 1) that the ordinance denies
the accused the presumption of innocence until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that the
ordinance in effect makes the defendant take the witness stand against his will.

To see if this ordinance denies the accused the presumption of innocence until he is proven guilty beyond

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reasonable doubt, we must deterine what the words
''prima facie evidence'' mean in the ordinance. The
words "prima facie evidence" are used in Section 10336-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, wherein it is provided:
''Possession of property recently stolen, when
the person in possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation, shall he deemed prima facie
evidence of guilt.''
The meaning of ''prima facie evidence'' in that
8tatute has been repeatedly interpreted and defined
by the decisions of this court. One of the earliest such
decisions, and one of the most complete, is the case of
State v. Potello, 119 P. 1023, 40 Utah 56. It is there
determined as follows:
"Now, what is meant by the term 'prima facie'
as here used in the statute~ If the meaning to
be given it is that, unless rebutted by other evidence, or discredited ,by circumstances, it hecomes, conclusive of the fact of guilt and to
operate upon the minds of the jury as decisive
of that fact, a meaning sometimes given the term
(Kelly v. Jackson, 31 U. S. 622, 9 L. Ed. '523;
State v. Burlingame, 146 Mo.-- 207, 48 S. · W. 72)
then again are we of the opinion that the legislature would have encroached upon the judiciary.
That is to say, we would be of such opinion, if,
upon the proof of the facts which the legislature
has declared shall be deemed and unexplained,
the jury would be required to find the accused
guilty of the alleged offense, though they should
not be convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We, however, are of the opinion
that the term 'prima facie' is not used in the
statute in that sense. It frequently is used in
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::-;tatutes similar to th, statntP here in question
in the sense of only presumptive evidence. (Stat P
, .. Hardelein, 169 ~Io. 37D. 70 S. W. 130; State
Y. Intoxicating Liquors, 80 ..\lo. 37, 12 Atl. 794;
~tate Y. K.line, 50 Ore. 426, 93 Pne. 237; Moore
, .. Hopkins, 83 Cal. 270, 23 Pac. 318, 17 A.m. St.
Rep. 248)
"In that ::;en::;e \\·e think it is used in this statute.
1,hat is, it is declared by the statute that l'.!:.2!!L
the roYen facts of the larcen recent ossesswn in the defendant1 and his ailure to satlsfictorily ~xplain his~ _Eoss_es~i()Il, an inference
or presumption a~·_!se§_,__~~nl~~s__re ~~!I~<l~
evidence or discredit~d by . circustances, of. the
further eilihng fact' fiiaT18 -was the- Cie£e:rlaa;t
t\~1oiiiousl);. toOkthe' prop;rty;t1e person ...
w1io committed the -r;;ov·ea ""larceny, and hence
a prima facie case of guilt is made against him.
Not that the jury, on such proven facts, though
unrebutted or not discredited by circumstances,
are required to convict if upon such . proven
facts they are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt, but that they,
upon such proven facts, if unrebutted or not
discredited by circumstances, may presume or
infer the further fact of the felonious taking
by the accused, and if, upon all the evidence
adduced, they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt, may convict.''

wnoc

~rhe later cases of State v. Berretta, et al, 47 Utah
479, 155 P. 343, and State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 294 P.
1108, also clearly indicate that "prima facie evidence",

as used in the statute, is for the direction of the court
as distinguished from the trier of the fact, be it judge
or jury, and that when ''prima facie evidence'' of guilt
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has been introduced by the state, even though that
evidence is unrebutted and uncontradicted, the trier
of the fact still must determine from all the evidence
whether or not the defendant 1s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In St. Louis v. Cook, supra, Ordinance No. 41240
read:
''The presence of any vehicle in or upon any
public street. . . in violation of any ordinance
regulating the parking of such vehicle... shall
be prima facie evidence that the person ; ... in
whose name such vehicle is registered on either
the records of the City License Collector or the
records of the Secretary of State of the State
of .Missouri, committed or authorized such violation.''
As to that, the Illinois court

~aid :

''The Ordinance No. 41240 does not in any way
change the burden of proof the city must carry
in making out a case, although the ordinance
does affect the burden of evidence. See the exposition of the difference between burden of
proof which does not shift and the burden of
evidence \\rhich may shift to a defendant to produce, if he desires, evidence which, if believed,
will meet a plaintiff's prima facie case. McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 1fo. 527, at Page 541, 46 S.
W. 2d 557, at page 563, 92 A. L. R. 641; Vol.
IX, Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., S 2485, pp.
270-274 and S 2487, pp. 278-284."
In People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N. W.
248, the court was charged with determining the validity of a prima facie ordinance passed by the city of
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same to have been unlawfully imported. The court
put aside the point made by the defendant that the
practical effect of the statute was to compel the accused
person to witness against himself. Said the court:

?
'' lhe statute com;gel3 11Qthi.!l_$· It does no more
than to make possession of the prohibited article
prima facie evidence of guilt. It leaves th~
aceused entirely free to testify or not as, he
ehoose:-;. If the accu:-;ed happens -to~
the ..onlv
'repositm-y of the facts necessary to negativ~
the presumption arising from his possession,
that is a misfortune which the statute under review does not create but which is inherent in the
case. The same situation might present itself
if there were no statutory presumption and a
prima facie case of concealment with knowledge
of unlawful importation were made by the evidence. The necessity of an explanation by the
accused would be quite as compelling in that
case as in this; but the constraint upon him to
give testimony would arise there, as it arises
here, simply from the force of the circumstances
and not from any form of compulsion forbidden
by the Constitution.''

be

In the case of City of St. Lou,is v. Cook, supra,
the appellant made the same argument as here made,
and the court held that the defendant was not deprived
of any constitutional right, such as being made to take
the witness stand against himself.
On Pages 10 and 11 of appellant's brief, he seems
to argue that Ordinance No. 343 is unreasonable because it is a common knowledge that in many instances
the registered owner is not the sole user of his auto18
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mohih'. Tlw Cit~· <Hlmit~ t hn t thP powPr of a legislatiYe body to 1nak~ the proof of rertain fact~ prima facie
evidence of other fart~. a~ i~ done by Ordinance No.
343, is limited in that the faet pre~nmed must reasonably
flow from the farts proven. As said in State 1'. Potello,
supra, Page 67 of Utah Reports:
"It undoubtedly is the established rule by the
great weight of authority that the legislature
has the power to declare that certain facts shall
be prima facie, presumptive or conclusive, evidence of another and substantive fact essential
to convict when they haYe some general relation
to or connection with such other fact.''
The presumption that the registered owner of a vehicle
parked his car or authorized the parking of his car in
violation of a parking ordinance naturally and reasonably flows from the fact that he is the registered
owner of the vehicle concerned. It has been so held
in St. Lou-is r. Cook, supra, City of Chica.go v. Crane,
supra; People v. Rubin, 284 N. Y. 392, 31 N. E. (2) 501.
The court said in People v. Bigman, supra, Page
372:
''Relationship between the registered owner of
an automobile and its operation is natural; if
he is not the operator on any occasion that fact
is directly within his knowledge and in the ordinary course of events can easily be proved with
such certainty as almost entirely to exclude the
possibilty of a false conviction.''
In People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 248,
(1938), testimony showed that in Detroit on Ja_nuary
14 and 15, 1938, in cases where an automobile was
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parked in violation of an ordinance, the owner parked
it 87.6% of the cases, members of the owner's immediate family in 8% of the cases, and some other person
in 4.4% of the cases.
The city's ordinance No. 343 doe~ not deprive the
accused of any right secured to him by the Federal or
State Constitutions.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE
CITY IS ENCROACHING UPON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY, AND THE
STATE LEGISLATURE.
Here again the contention is merely another way
to state appellant's Point I. If the city has the exress or implied power to enact Ordinance No. 343, the
ordinance is binding upon the judiciary. If it has that
power, the enacting of the ordinance is no J1lOre an encroachment of the functions of the judiciary .QL upon
the--f~n~~t-ions
the state legislat~'e than for the _city
to ena<;~ an O!'<fin~E_C~~ under the powers delegated to
it, for example, i!l~ _E2_ection 15-8-4], Uta_h Code Annotated, l943, to suppress or prohibit prostitution and
gambling and other
activities. There are legi;ia~
tive fields in which -b~ti1-th_e_ state legislature and the city
commission of Ogden City can act without one encroaching upon the other. The question is whether or not
Ogden City has the express or implied power to enact
that ordinance.

gf

-reiate'd-

It is submitted that the appellant has misconceived
the ruling in State v. Patella, supra. That case held
that by the express words of the Utah statute, to make
20
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a prima facie case of lnrreny, tht"' state had to prove
the aeeused had possession of rcePntly stolen property, and that he failed to gi,·e a ~atifaetory explanation therefor.
The court in said case did not hold that had the
statute provided that mere possession of recently stolen
property was prinut facie eYidence of guilt would be
unconstitutional. The court did hold that if the statute made mere possession of recently stolen property
conclusire evidence of quilt, that it would be unconstitutional.
It seems to the city that the case clearly interprets
what is meant by prima facie evidence, and it clearly
holds that the statute passed by the State Legislature
complies with the constituional provisions and is valid.
11he appellant's brief. says at Page 13:
''Ogden City's ordinance stops just where the
legislation, assumed in the language of the court
in the Potello case, stopped. It makes the mere
ownership of the car, and proof that the car was
illegally parked by someone, proof of the guilt
of the owner. ~rhis clearly then is an attempt
by the city to impose upon the courts of this
state a substantive rule of evidence, which the
state legislature, even with its much broader
power, could not do under the language of the
above quoted case, without imposing upon the
functions of the judiciary. ' '
Ogden City's ordinance does not attempt to do
what was condemned in the Potello case. Ogden City's
ordinance still makes the proof of ownership and violation of the ordinance only prima facie evidence of
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guilt, not conclusive. Under the ordinance, the defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
POINT IV
APPIDLLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE
CITY HAS NEVER RECEIVED AUTHORITY
FROM THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION rro
PLACE· PARKING METERS UPON ST.ATE
HIGHvVAYS WITHIN ITS BORDERS.
The stipulation of facts does not include anything
concerning whether or not Ogden City has received permission from a State Road Commission to install parking meters on 24th Street. There is, therefore, no evidence one way or the other before this court. It is
presumed that a city exercise its powers in a lawful
manner, and it is submitted that until evidence is introduced to the contrary, it should be presumed that
Ogden City placed parking meters on 24th Street with
permission of the State Road Commission.
Whether or not the State Road Commission has
given that authority to Ogden City is not a matter of
which this court can take judicial notice. The appellant should have introduced evidence on this question
in the district court, or should have required the stipulation to cover the same. However, if this court can
take judicial notice of the actions of the Road Commission in this matter, it will learn that the State Road
Co~mission interprets ·the words ''traffic control device" in Section 57-7-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
as not. to include parking meters. The Commission

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

therefore permit:::; any iH~t:lll:1tion b~· local authorities
of parking· meter~ on any and all state highways ai
the sole discretion of the local authorities.
It is further submitted that the qw:-stion of whether
or not Ogden C'ity has permission from the State Road
Commission to erert parking meters on a state highway is a matter which is between Ogden City and the
~tate Road Commission, and that the users of the
highways are not proper parties to such a controversy.
As long as traffic control devices and parking meters
haYe been installed and are in use, the drivers of vehicles
should observe and comply with the directions of those
traffic control devices.

:Moreover, section 57-7-85 expressly negatives any
legislative intention to deprive local authorities of
authority to regulate parking and charge a fee therefor by any device.
POINT V
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION WAS NOT
GIVEN DUE NOTICE OF ANY ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY THE CITY.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the stipulation of facts
show that the jurisdiction of the city court over the
appellant is based upon the issuance of a complaint,
followed by the issuance and service of a summons
upon the appellant ordering him to appear on a date
certain to answer the charges in the complaint thretofore filed. Ogden City makes no claim of jurisdiction
over the appellant arising out of the placing of the
ticket on the windshield of appellant's automobile. There
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was personal service of summons upon the appellant;
he was therefore served by one of the three methods
which the appellant himself, in Page 16 of his brief,
says is an authororized method of service.
The like point was raised in Chicago v. Crane supra,
where the court held :
'' rrhe contention of defendant made at the opening of the trial (he has filed no brief in this
court) seems to be that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over him because the police officer
attached a ticket to the parked automobile. This
is clearly a misapprehension. The city does not
claim it obtained jurisdiction in this manner
but says that afterwards a complaint was filed,
a warrant issued and he was taken on the warrant
and appeared in the trial of the case. Obviously
the court had jurisdiction over him.''

CITY'S POINT I
':rHA':r ORDINANCE No. 343 IS :MERELY DECLARATIVE OF WHAT WAS ALREADY
THE LAW, IN THAT, EVEN WITHOUT ORDINANCE No. 343, PROOF OF A VEHICLE
STANDING OR PARKING IN VIOLATION OF
AN ORDINANCE OF OGDEN CITY TOGE
THER WITH PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANT IS THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE IS
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT THE
DEFENDANT OWNER COMMITTED OR
AUTHORIZED THE COJYIMISSION OF SUCH
VIOLATION.
It has been held that though there was no ordinance
or statute defining prima facie evidence, a city makes a
prima facie case in a trial for a parking violation by pro-
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ing only that the defendant is the rPgi8tered owner of the
vehicle and that ~aid ,·ehiclc was parked in violation of
a parking ordinance. In People :-. Rubin, 28-t- N. Y.
39:2, 31 X. E. (:2) 501, the court said:
The defendant a l~o contends that violation of
the ordinance wns not proved. The record on
this point is ver~· brief. The defendant conceded
that the police officer who made the charges
found the car in question parked at the times
and places charged in the city and county of
X e\Y York for the length of time charged in the
complant and that the defendant was the licensed
owner of the car in each instance. No evidence
was offered by the defendant. No question is
made of the right of the magistrate to take judi~
cial notice of the character of the localities as
fallmg within the description of the regulation.
'rhe concession made out a prima facie case.
The contrary is urged because there was no direct proof that the stationing of the car in violation of the ordinance was done by the defendant. To rule that this inference may not be
drawn from the established facts would be to
deny to the trier of the facts the right to use
a common process of reasoning. Justice v. Lang,
52 N. Y. 323. Ownership of a vehicle in civil
cases has long been recognized as prima facie
proof that it was being operated by or for the
owner. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 116 N.
E. 78, 8 A. L. R. 785 ; St. Andrassy v. Mooney,
262 N. Y. 268, 186 N. E. 867. Here, ownership
has been held a sufficient basis for an inference
of personal conduct. If he was not in control
he could easily have produced a witness or witnesses to show it. People v. Dyle, 21 N. Y. 578;
People ex rei. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y.
H
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456, 465, 119 N. E. 102, 4 A. L. R. 463. We find
it competent under the circumstances to conclude from the proof that the owner of the car
controlled the car and personally violated the
regulation. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass.
25, 189 N. E. 601. Of. People v. Kayne, 286
Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 248." (Italics Added)
In City of St. Louis v. Cook, supra, the court said on
this point:
''Even when there had been no legislative action enacting such a rule of evidence the inferenc that the owner parked or was responsible
for the parking of a vehicle has been held to be
reasonable and sufficient, City of Chicago v.
Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N. E. 2d 802; People
v. Rubin, 284 N". Y. 392, 31 N. E. 2d 501, although
the supreme court of the State of Rhode Island
was evenly divided on the question, State v.
Morgan, 72 R. I. 101, 48 A. (2d) 248."
There is thus very good authority for the proposi' tion that the city's ordinance No. 343 merely -declares
. what is a rule of evidence in full for~e and ~-ff~ct .-~·nd
binding on the courts, even had that ordinance not.
been enacted. It foilo\\'s that The -·ordinance, "·whiTe~it ·
maybe -unnecess~uy, nevert'h.eless 'rs-v;lid.
~........ .- '
-----~~---~

--

~

-----

CONCLUSION
Ordinance K o. 343 of Ogden City is thus supported and authorized on three grounds, any one of
which would be sufficient:
a. Its enactment is within the fairly or necessarily implied powers delegated to the city by
26.
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Sections 15-8-11. 30 and 57-7-85, U. C. A., 1943.
b. Its enactment is within the express powers
deleg·ated to the city by Sertion 15-8-84, U. C. A.,
1943, to promote the peace, g·ood order and conYenience of the city and its inhabitants.
e. It is merely declatory of a rule of evidence
which exish;; without the ordinance and as a result of a common process of reasoning from the
facts of the case.
The ordinance denies to the accused no rights
given by the State or Federal Constitutions. No encroachment is made On the legisla tiYe Or judiciary
branches of the state.
Jurisdiction of the defendant was obtained In a
manner authorized.
This court should therefore affirm the judgment
of the district court.
Respectfully submitted,
Paul Thatcher
Clyde C. Patterson
Charles H. Sneddon
Jack A. Richards
Attorneys for Respondent
Respondent's Address :
.Municipal Building
Ogden, Utah
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